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THE BIOLOGICS PRICE COMPETITION AND INNOVATION ACT AT
10—A STOCKTAKING
Yaniv Heled†
ABSTRACT
On March 23, 2010, President Obama signed into law the Biologics
Price Competition and Innovation Act (BPCIA) as part of the Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act (“Obamacare”). The purpose of
BPCIA was to create for biologics a regime similar to that of the Drug
Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act (Hatch–Waxman
Act) and, in so doing, to open biologics markets to competition and,
subsequently, lower the price of these expensive and increasingly
important pharmaceuticals. Using original data, this Essay takes
stock of the decade that has passed since the enactment of BPCIA. This
Essay surveys the state of competition in United States biologics
markets, entry of follow-on biologics into these markets, and the
effects such entry has had on biologics prices.
This Essay’s main findings are that, as of March 23, 2020—exactly
ten years since the signing of BPCIA into law—the FDA has approved
a total of 26 follow-on biologics deemed biosimilar to 9 original
products (ratio: 2.63 follow-on/original products), with only 16 of
these deemed biosimilar to 7 original products (ratio: 1.78 followon/original products) actually available on the market. None of these
follow-on products have been approved as interchangeable with their
reference products, which means that substitution of the 7 original
products with one of their 16 approved biosimilars cannot be done
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automatically. The price of these products was 10%–37% lower than
the price of the original biologic, with the average price savings being
24% or 27%. All 35 approved follow-on and reference products are
owned by a total of 11 pharmaceutical companies. The number of
years of market exclusivity of the 9 original biologics before the
approval of the first biosimilar ranged between 13.5–28.92 with an
average of 18.27 years or 15.33–29.42 with an average of 19.87 years
before the launch of the first competing biosimilar.
This Essay further puts forward a new method of measuring
comparative levels of competition in drug markets by comparing the
ratio of total approved follow-on products per total approved original
products at certain critical benchmarks. Using this measurement tool,
this Essay compares BPCIA’s track record with the levels of
competition in small-molecule drugs before and after the Hatch–
Waxman Act, showing that that BPCIA significantly underperforms in
comparison and fails to instigate levels of competition that would lead
to significant price drops and increase access to biologics in the
United States. A short survey of the most likely reasons for BPCIA’s
underperformance follows.
This Essay concludes by presenting the following question: if
BPCIA’s current track record is (still) not enough to convince that it
is failing to meet its goals, what more would it take to reach such a
conclusion, and how much longer should policymakers wait before it
is possible to surmise that BPCIA in its current form has failed to
significantly increase access to biologics in the United States?
I. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................... 82
II. BPCIA AT 10—THE NUMBERS ..................................................... 84
III. NOT A HATCH–WAXMAN SUCCESS STORY.................................. 87
IV. REASONS FOR BPCIA’S POOR TRACK RECORD ........................... 93
V. CONCLUSION............................................................................... 100
I. INTRODUCTION
On March 23, 2010, President Obama signed the Biologics
Price Competition and Innovation Act (BPCIA) as part of the Patient
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Protection and Affordable Care Act (“Obamacare”).1 The purpose of
BPCIA was to create for biologics a regime similar to that of the Drug
Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act (Hatch–Waxman
Act)2 and, in doing so, to open biologics markets to greater
competition and, subsequently, lower the price of these expensive and
increasingly important pharmaceuticals.3 Ten years later, competition
in biologics remains scant and prices high. Biologics product markets
are highly concentrated in the hands of a few large pharmaceutical
companies that compete over market share with small to minimal
effect on product prices. While some believe that it might still be “too
soon to give up” on BPCIA,4 others—including the undersigned—
have seen this as a sign of BPCIA’s failure.5
Written for the Texas A&M University School of Law
Symposium on Pharmaceutical Innovation, Patent Protection, and
Regulatory Exclusivities, this Essay takes stock of the decade that has
passed since the enactment of BPCIA. Relying on new data, this Essay
surveys the state of competition in United States biologics markets,
entry of follow-on biologics (“biosimilars”) into these markets, and
the effects such entry has had on biologics prices. This Essay further
puts forward a new method of measuring comparative levels of
competition in drug markets by comparing the ratio of total approved
follow-on products per approved original products. Using this
measurement tool, this Essay compares BPCIA’s track record with the
1. The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. NO. 111-148, §§
7001–7003, 124 Stat. 119, 804–23 (2010).
2. Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, PUB. L.
NO. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15, 21, 35
& 42 U.S.C. (2012)) [hereinafter Hatch-Waxman Act].
3. See e.g., Andrew W. Mulcahy et al., Biosimilar Cost Savings in the United
States, 7 RAND HEALTH Q. 3, 6 (2018) (“[W]hile only 1-2 percent of the U.S.
population is treated with a specialty drug each year—a category that includes
biologics and other complex, often expensive drugs, biologics alone accounted for
38 percent of U.S. prescription drug spending in 2015 due to their high cost per dose,
and for 70 percent of drug spending growth between 2010 and 2015.”
4. See, e.g., Jonathan J. Darrow, Biosimilar Approvals and the BPCIA: Too
Soon to Give Up, HEALTH AFFAIRS BLOG (July 19, 2019),
https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20190718.722161/full/
[https://perma.cc/6ADQ-27RQ].
5. See e.g., Preston Atteberry et al., Biologics Are Natural Monopolies (Part
1): Why Biosimilars Do Not Create Effective Competition, HEALTH AFFAIRS BLOG
(Apr. 15, 2019), https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20190405.396631
/full/ [https://perma.cc/F4US-YPFF]; Yaniv Heled, Follow-On Biologics are Set Up
to Fail, 2018 U. ILL. L. REV. ONLINE 113, 115 (2018).
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state of competition in small-molecule drugs before and after the
Hatch–Waxman Act, concluding that BPCIA significantly
underperforms in comparison and fails to instigate the kind of
competition that would lead to significant drops in the prices of
biologics in the United States. A short survey of the most likely
reasons for BPCIA’s underperformance follows.
This Essay concludes by presenting this question: if BPCIA’s
current track record is (still) not enough to convince that it is failing to
meet its goals of significantly increasing access to biologics in the
United States, what more would it take to reach such a conclusion, and
how much longer should policymakers wait?
II. BPCIA AT 10—THE NUMBERS
After significant delays in BPCIA’s implementation,6 in
March 2015, the FDA approved the first follow-on version of a
biologic: the biosimilar Zarxio.7 Between that time and March 23,
2020—exactly ten years since BPCIA was signed—the FDA approved
a total of 26 follow-on biologics that were deemed biosimilar to 9
original products (“reference products”8).9 None of these 26
biosimilars have been approved as or deemed interchangeable with
6. See discussion infra Part IV.
7. Drugs@FDA: FDA-Approved Drugs, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.,
https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/cder/daf/index.cfm?event=overview.proces
s&ApplNo=125553 [https://perma.cc/N2V6-D7VH] (last visited May 13, 2020)
(citing the approval date of Zarxio as March 6, 2015).
8. See 42 U.S.C. § 262(i)(4) (2018) (“The term ‘reference product’ means the
single biological product licensed under subsection (a) against which a [follow-on]
biological product is evaluated…”).
9. See infra Appendix A, Table I [hereinafter Table I]. According to the FDA’s
Purple Book, by that date the FDA had approved about 270 original biologics for
marketing in the United States (including 17 products whose licenses were later
voluntarily revoked). See FDA, Purple Book: Database of Licensed Biological
Products,
https://purplebooksearch.fda.gov/advanced-search
[https://perma.cc/3SWT-QPR6] (last visited May 31, 2020). The number of
approved biologics is exclusive of vaccines, blood products, gene therapies,
allergens, and other products approved by the Center for Biologics Evaluation and
Research. See Purple Book: Database of Licensed Biological Products, U.S. FOOD
& DRUG ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/media/89426/download (last accessed June
27, 2020) [https://perma.cc/YB78-P7EK]. The numbers include products that were
originally approved as small-molecule drugs but were “deemed” to have been
approved as biologics as of March 23, 2020. See infra notes 55–56 and
accompanying text; See also List of Approved NDAs for Biological Products that
were Deemed to be BLAs on March 23, 2020, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (2020),
https://www.fda.gov/media/119229/download [https://perma.cc/C8B2-3JK5].
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their reference product,10 which means that substitution of the 9
original products with one of their approved biosimilars cannot be
done automatically, but rather require the prescribing physician to
specifically prescribe the biosimilar.11 As of May 2020, only 16 of
these 26 approved biosimilars, which were deemed biosimilar to 7
reference products, were actually available on the market.12 The price
of these products was 10%–37% lower, on average, than the price of
the original biologic,13 with the average price savings being 24% or
27%.14
Eight pharmaceutical companies owned the 26 approved
biosimilars.15 Four companies owned the 9 original products with
which these biosimilars sought to compete.16 In total, competition in
biologics occurred between 11 pharmaceutical companies (with
Amgen owning both original and follow-on products). The ratio of
original product owners to follow-on product owners is 1:2,
suggesting that concentration levels in biologics product markets
remain high even after original products lose their exclusivity
protections.
The 9 original biologics for which biosimilars have been
approved had between 1–5 approved biosimilars with an average of
2.63 approved biosimilars for each original product and 1.78 launched
biosimilars per original product.17

10. Non-interchangeable pharmaceuticals are, by their nature, not fungible and
therefore produce little competition. See infra notes 48-52 and accompanying text.
11. See Heled supra note 5, at 125–26.
12. See infra Table I.
13. Data is based on prices listed on the websites Drugs.com and GoodRx.com
on May 7, 2020. See Appendix A, Table II. According to GoodRx.com (but not
Drugs.com), as of April 2020, the price of Pfizer’s Retacrit—the only approved
biosimilar for Amgen’s original biologics Epogen and Procrit, constituted savings
of 67% and 80% respectively. See Lauren Chase, A Guide to Biosimilar Prices: How
Much They Cost and How You Can Save, GOODRX BLOG (Apr. 14, 2020, 11:32 AM)
https://www.goodrx.com/blog/biosimilars-prices-how-much-they-cost-how-tosave/ [https://perma.cc/E5F8-3WAR].
14. Based on average savings calculations from Drugs.com and GoodRx.com
respectively. See infra Appendix A, Table III [hereinafter Table III].
15. The companies are Amgen, Boehringer Ingelheim, Celltrion (a subsidiary of
Teva), Coherus BioSciences, Mylan GmbH, Pfizer (including its subsidiary
Hospira), Samsung Bioepis, and Sandoz. See infra Table I.
16. The companies are AbbVie, Amgen, Genentech (a subsidiary of Roche), and
Janssen Biotech (a subsidiary of Johnson & Johnson). See Table I.
17. See infra Table III.
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The number of years of market exclusivity of the 9 original
biologics before the approval of the first biosimilar ranged between
13.5–28.92 with an average of 18.27 years.18 The number of years of
market exclusivity of these 9 original biologics before the launch of
the first competing biosimilar (which virtually always came many
months after FDA approval) ranged between 15.33–29.42, and the
average years of market exclusivity was 19.87.19 The average list price
of original biologics for which there already were biosimilars
available on the market was $3,750 per month.20
As these numbers show, ten years after BPCIA’s enactment, it
has brought only minimal competition to a mere handful of biologics
markets and led to small price drops in these markets.21 Despite
18. Id. According to research funded by the Pharmaceutical Research and
Manufacturers of America (PhRMA)—the pharmaceutical industry’s main lobbying
arm—the average period of market exclusivity in small-molecule drugs for which
follow-on products were approved between 1995–2014 was 12.5 years for products
with annual sales greater than $250 million and 13.6 years overall. See Henry
Grabowski et al., Updated Trends in US Brand-Name and Generic Drug
Competition, 19 J. MED. ECON. 836, 836 (2016). This means that exclusivity in
biologics for which follow-on products were approved between 2015–2020 was
between 1–16.42 and on average 5.77 years longer than the average exclusivity in
high-grossing, small-molecule drugs.
19. See infra Table III. This means that exclusivity in biologics for which followon products were launched was between 2.83–16.92 and on average 6.37 years
longer than the average exclusivity in high-grossing, small-molecule drugs.
20. See infra Table III. While the list price, namely the price a manufacturer
assigns to a drug product, does not reflect discounts that are typically given to health
insurance providers, it is still the price that patients without insurance may pay and
is the official price tag of a pharmaceutical. See also Chase, supra note 13; cf. Joel
Lexchin, Affordable Biologics for All, JAMA NETWORK OPEN e204753 (Apr. 27,
2020),
https://jamanetwork.com/journals/jamanetworkopen/fullarticle/2764808
[https://perma.cc/Q8UF-JJ4R].
21. As in previous work, by significant/meaningful/true competition I mean
levels of competition sufficient to drive down the cost of biologics (and follow-on
versions thereof) significantly for payors and patient-consumers, well beyond the
10%–37% price drops currently observed in the United States’ biologics markets
subsequent to follow-on products’ entry. For comparison, in the context of smallmolecule drugs, significant price drops of more than 70% are typical subsequent to
the entry of 4–5 or more generic products into a specific drug market. See New
Evidence Linking Greater Generic Competition and Lower Generic Drug Prices,
U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/about-fda/center-drugevaluation-and-research-cder/generic-competition-and-drug-prices
[https://perma.cc/RVM9-2375] (last visited May 13, 2020). See also Generic
Competition and Drug Prices, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., https://wayback.archiveit.org/7993/20190423134204/https://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/CentersOffices/Offi
ceofMedicalProductsandTobacco/CDER/ucm129385.htm [https://perma.cc/3UZJR39Y] (last visited May 13, 2020).
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BPCIA’s creation of a regulatory pathway for approval of follow-on
biologics, product markets remain highly concentrated in the hands of
a few large pharmaceutical companies that compete with each other
over market share with small to minimal effect on product prices.
Interestingly, BPCIA’s highly controversial and unusually
22
long twelve-year market exclusivity for original biologics with
approved follow-on products23 has proved to be shorter, in some cases
much shorter, than the actual period during which these original
products maintain their exclusivity in their respective productmarkets. Indeed, even the shortest period—15.33 years in Genentech’s
Avastin—was 3 years and 4 months longer than the twelve-year
exclusivity awarded under BPCIA;24 the longest period—29.42 years
in Amgen’s Epogen/Procrit—was nearly 17 years and 6 months
longer, 2.5 times BPCIA’s twelve-year exclusivity.25 These numbers
support the proposition that biologics are “natural monopolies” that
are not amenable to meaningful competition (or that they are grossly
overprotected) and that attempts—such as BPCIA26—to significantly
lower biologics’ prices through market mechanisms is therefore
unlikely to succeed.27
III. NOT A HATCH–WAXMAN SUCCESS STORY
From its inception, BPCIA was fashioned after the same
concept that lies at the heart of the Hatch–Waxman Act: that original
product prices would drop if follow-on products enter the market and
that follow-on products would enter the market if follow-on product
22. See e.g., Heled, supra note 5, at 117 n.28.
23. 42 U.S.C. § 262(k)(7) (2018).
24. See infra Table III. Notably, twelve years was the length of exclusivity for
which the original products industry lobbied prior to the enactment of BPCIA. See,
e.g., Safe and Affordable Biotech Drugs: The Need for a Generic Pathway: Hearing
Before the H. Comm. on Oversight and Government Reform, 110th Cong. p. 162
(2007) (statement of Henry Grabowski, Ph.D.) (recommending an exclusivity period
of at least 10 years). See also Henry Grabowski, Follow-on Biologics: Data
Exclusivity and the Balance Between Innovation and Competition, 7 NATURE REV.
DRUG DISCOVERIES 479, 486 (2008) (in research funded by PhRMA, arguing that
the proper market exclusivity period for biologics should fall between 12.9 and 16.2
years).
25. See infra Table III.
26. An even less complementary view of BPCIA is that from its outset it was illequipped to instill significant competition into biologics markets. See, e.g., Heled,
supra note 5, at 115–19.
27. See, e.g., Atteberry et al., supra note 5.
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manufacturers are allowed to “piggyback” on earlier approvals of
original products and make their own copycat versions. In this way,
presumably, follow-on product manufacturers would be able to save
the time and money involved in developing an original product and
partake in existing, lucrative product markets. This arrangement was
implemented in small-molecule drugs starting the 1970s and was,
ultimately, streamlined and improved in the Hatch–Waxman Act in
1984.28 The Hatch–Waxman Act’s success has made it the model that
BPCIA was meant to follow.
Nonetheless, a straight up comparison of BPCIA’s track record
with that of the Hatch–Waxman Act is problematic. As Professor
Jonathan Darrow explained, there are several, significant differences
between small-molecule drug markets subsequent to the enactment of
the Hatch–Waxman Act in 1984 and biologics markets subsequent to
the enactment of BPCIA in 2010. By the enactment of the Hatch–
Waxman Act, the FDA had already approved follow-on
pharmaceutical product applications for about fourteen years, and both
regulators and product developers had acquired significant experience
from approval of more than 2,000 such applications.29 By contrast,
when BPCIA was signed into law, the FDA and product developers
had little to no experience in making and comparing follow-on
biologics.30 Professor Darrow also correctly notes that a numeric
28. See Jonathan Darrow, The Rise of Biosimilars: Success of the BPCIA? (Part
I),
BILL
OF
HEALTH
BLOG
(Jan.
31,
2020),
https://blog.petrieflom.law.harvard.edu/2020/01/31/the-rise-of-biosimilars-successof-the-bpcia/ [https://perma.cc/E8RS-FR56] (reviewing the history of approval of
follow-on pharmaceutical product applications by the FDA beginning the 1970s). In
addition to setting the pathway for approval of follow-on small-molecule drugs in
legislation, the Hatch–Waxman Act instituted incentives for development of original
and generic drugs and established an intricate patent dispute resolution framework
(including the Orange Book) that is interwoven into the pathway for approval of
generic versions of original products. See Hatch–Waxman Act, supra note 2.
29. See Drugs@FDA Data Files, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., Drugs@FDA
Data Files, https://www.fda.gov/drugs/drug-approvals-and-databases/drugsfdadata-files [https://perma.cc/LC2E-DSFR] (last visited May 31, 2020). The data
includes original and supplemental approved applications. The results exclude
tentatively approved applications and supplemental applications for which there was
an approved original application.
30. See Jonathan Darrow, The Rise of Biosimilars: Success of the BPCIA? (Part
I),
BILL
OF
HEALTH
BLOG
(Jan.
31,
2020),
https://blog.petrieflom.law.harvard.edu/2020/01/31/the-rise-of-biosimilars-successof-the-bpcia/ [https://perma.cc/E8RS-FR56]. What little experience product
developers have had with development and approval of follow-on biologics was
based on their experience in Europe. See discussion infra Part IV.
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comparison of the number of original products amenable to follow-on
product applications—subsequent to the enactment of the Hatch–
Waxman Act and BPCIA—is not instructive because there were and
still are far more original small-molecule products than biologics that
are amenable to such applications.31 In other words, there were
significantly fewer original biologics amenable to follow-on
competition in 2010 than there were small-molecule drugs amenable
to competition before and subsequent to the enactment of the Hatch–
Waxman Act in 1984.
Still, some insight into the performance of BPCIA may be
gleaned from comparing the ratios of approved follow-on products to
original products under both regimes around the time that the FDA
and the industry are likely to have acquired experience with follow-on
applications. Measurement of approved follow-on to original product
ratios—which is proposed here for the first time as a means of
measuring comparative levels of competition in drug markets—
provides a bird’s-eye view of the level of follow-on competition in
pharmaceutical markets in their entirety (as opposed to specific drug
markets). As such, the measurement of ratios provides a picture of the
extent of “openness” of drug markets to competition and the
willingness and ability of follow-on manufacturers to develop and
pursue approval of follow-on versions of original pharmaceutical
products, and the ability of follow-on manufacturers to do so
successfully, despite whatever technical and regulatory hurdles they
may face. Because the comparison is one of ratios rather than product
numbers, the comparison makes it possible to control for differences
in sheer number of approved products. Accordingly, a comparison of
the number of follow-on applications per number of original products
a decade after the commencement of FDA approval of follow-on

31. See Jonathan Darrow, The Rise of Biosimilars: Success of the BPCIA? (Part
II),
BILL
OF
HEALTH
BLOG
(Feb.
3,
2020),
https://blog.petrieflom.law.harvard.edu/2020/02/03/the-rise-of-biosimilars-successof-the-bpcia-part-ii/ [https://perma.cc/5TFS-YGD4]. There is no good data on how
many original biologics were no longer protected by exclusivity and therefore
amenable to follow-on competition in 2010. However, it is highly probable that the
number of such products was also significantly smaller than the number of products
amenable to such competition when the Hatch–Waxman Act was enacted, which
was estimated at 125. See id.
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applications in biologics and small-molecule drug markets,
respectively, may be instructive.32
By April 24, 1980—a decade after the FDA announced that it
will accept and start approving follow-on products (Abbreviated New
Drug Applications or “ANDA”s)33—the FDA approved 1,193
applications for original drugs (New Drug Applications or “NDA”s)
and 1,324 ANDAs—a ratio of 1.1 approved follow-on products per 1
original product.34 By September 24, 1984—the day the Hatch–
Waxman Act was signed into law—the FDA approved 1,580 NDAs
and 2,131 ANDAs, giving a ratio of 1.35 approved follow-on products
per 1 original product.35 And by September 24, 1994, ten years after
the enactment of the Hatch–Waxman Act, the FDA approved 2,289
NDAs and 4,375 ANDAs, resulting in a ratio of 1.91 approved follow
on products per 1 original product.36 The trend of ratios of the total
numbers of approved ANDAs to NDAs over time may be observed in
the following chart:

32. Notably, while the comparison of ratios of follow-on and approved products
is useful for overcoming the variance in the number of total approved products under
the different regulatory regimes, it may be insufficiently sensitive—at least in its
current form—to potentially important differences in the commercial and regulatory
realities of small-molecule drugs and biologics, including in the length of exclusivity
protections and market sizes. Controlling for these factors, however, is beyond the
scope of this work. At the very least, as it currently stands, the comparison supports
the proposition that ten years after the enactment of BPCIA levels of competition in
biologics markets are not even close to the levels of competition seen in smallmolecule drug markets even before the enactment of the Hatch-Waxman Act, let
alone ten years after its enactment.
33. See Food and Drug Administration, Abbreviated Applications, 35 Fed. Reg.
6574, 13540 (Apr. 24, 1970).
34. See Drugs@FDA Data Files, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., Drugs@FDA
Data Files, https://www.fda.gov/drugs/drug-approvals-and-databases/drugsfdadata-files [https://perma.cc/LC2E-DSFR] (last visited May 31, 2020) (data includes
original and supplemental approved applications). The results exclude tentatively
approved applications and supplemental applications for which there was an
approved original application.
35. Id.
36. Id.
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Ratio of Approved ANDAs to NDAs, 1970‐1995
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By comparison, by March 23, 2020, a decade after the
enactment of BPCIA, the FDA approved a total of 268 original
biologics and 26 applications for follow-on products,37 a ratio of about
0.1 follow-on products per 1 original product, or 1 follow-on product
per 10 original products. The trend of ratios of the total number of
approved biosimilars (“ABLA”s) to original biologics (“BLA”s) over
time may be observed in the following chart:

Ratio of Approved ABLAs to BLAs, 2010‐2019
1
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0.8
0.7
0.6
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A comparison of the ratios and trends of approvals of follow-on
products per original products over time is illustrated in the chart
37. See Purple Book: Database of Licensed Biological Products, U.S. FOOD &
DRUG ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/media/89426/download (last accessed June 27,
2020) [https://perma.cc/YB78-P7EK].
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below with “year 0” designated as the year of enactment of legislation
formalizing the process of approval of follow-on products—Hatch–
Waxman Act for small-molecule drugs and BPCIA for biologics,
respectively:

Comparison of Ratio of Accepted ANDAs/NDAs
and ABLAs/BLAs
2.5
2
1.5
1
0.5
0
‐14‐13‐12‐11‐10 ‐9 ‐8 ‐7 ‐6 ‐5 ‐4 ‐3 ‐2 ‐1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Ratio of ANDAs/NDAs

Ratio of ABLAs/BLAs

Examination of these trends reveals, again, a significant
underperformance of BPCIA compared to the approval of generic
drugs both before and after the enactment of the Hatch–Waxman Act.
The comparative underperformance of BPCIA can be attributed, at
least in part, to the fact that biologics are typically covered by more
patents than a typical small-molecule drug product, are more difficult
to imitate, and that the commercial and regulatory realities of
small-molecule drugs and biologics are different. Still, if drafters of
the BPCIA expected it to function like the Hatch–Waxman Act, then
these numbers show that it is failing to do so. In comparing the
performance of BPCIA to the track record of approval of follow-on
small-molecule drugs, it is also important to remember that products
approved under an ANDA are generic versions of the original product
and, thus, automatically substitutable with the original product.
Biosimilars, on the other hand—at least the ones that have been
approved to date—are not automatically substitutable with the
original, reference product and are, thus, inferior as potential
instigators of competition and price drops in their respective drug
markets, which further contributes to the conclusion that BPCIA fails
to achieve its goals.
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Furthermore, experience from the area of small-molecule
drugs shows that significant price drops of over 70% typically require
4 or more different competitors in the same product market.38 By April
24, 1980, there were 96 original small-molecule drug products with 4
or more approved follow-on versions; by September 24, 1984, there
were 142; by September 24, 1994, there were 292.39 In comparison,
by March 2020, there was only 1 original biologic—Genentech’s
Herceptin—with 4 follow-on versions available on the market.40 None
of these 4 follow-on products are interchangeable with the original
product, and the price savings in these products range between 10%–
27% as compared with the original product.41
To recap, these numbers show that ten years after the
enactment of BPCIA the levels of competition (and price drops) in
biologics markets are nowhere near the levels seen a decade after the
FDA began approving follow-on versions of original small-molecule
drug products before the enactment of the Hatch–Waxman Act. They
are light-years away from the levels of competition seen ten years after
the enactment of the Hatch–Waxman Act.
IV. REASONS FOR BPCIA’S POOR TRACK RECORD
There are many causes for BPCIA’s poor track record and,
more generally, the ongoing lack of significant price competition in
biologics markets.42 To begin with, at least some of BPCIA’s
38. See New Evidence Linking Greater Generic Competition and Lower Generic
Drug Prices, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/about-fda/centerdrug-evaluation-and-research-cder/generic-competition-and-drug-prices
[https://perma.cc/RVM9-2375] (last visited May 13, 2020); see also Generic
Competition and Drug Prices, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., https://wayback.archiveit.org/7993/20190423134204/https://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/CentersOffices/Offi
ceofMedicalProductsandTobacco/CDER/ucm129385.htm [https://perma.cc/3UZJR39Y] (last visited May 13, 2020).
39. See Drugs@FDA Data Files, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., Drugs@FDA
Data Files, https://www.fda.gov/drugs/drug-approvals-and-databases/drugsfdadata-files [https://perma.cc/LC2E-DSFR] (last visited May 31, 2020) (data includes
original and supplemental approved applications). The results exclude tentatively
approved applications and supplemental applications for which there was an
approved original application.
40. See infra Table I.
41. See infra Table III.
42. See e.g., Preston Atteberry et al., Biologics Are Natural Monopolies (Part
1): Why Biosimilars Do Not Create Effective Competition, HEALTH AFFAIRS BLOG
(Apr. 15, 2019), https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20190405.396631
/full/ [https://perma.cc/F4US-YPFF]; Michael A. Carrier & Carl J. Minniti III,
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disappointing track record may be attributed to its relative
“belatedness” and to delays in its implementation. By the time of
BPCIA’s enactment in 2010, the United States was already well
behind Europe in instituting a framework for approval of follow-on
biologics, especially considering that discussions of follow-on
biologics and creation of a Hatch–Waxman-like framework for
biologics have been ongoing in the United States since the late
1990s.43 To compare, Europe has had a framework for approval of
follow-on biologics in place since 2003, approved its first biosimilar
application in 2006, and has approved 66 follow-on biologics since.44
And yet, it took the FDA two years after BPCIA was enacted to issue
its first draft guidance on how the FDA intends to evaluate
Biologics: The New Antitrust Frontier, 2018 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 67–68 (2018); Heled,
supra note 5, at 135.
43. See Krista Hessler Carver, Jeffrey Elikan, & Erika Lietzan, An Unofficial
Legislative History of the Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act of 2009,
65 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 671, 685–86 (2010).
44. See Medicines, EUROPEAN MEDICINES AGENCY, https://www.ema.europa.eu
/en/medicines/field_ema_web_categories%253Aname_field/Human/ema_group_ty
pes/ema_medicine/field_ema_med_status/authorised36/ema_medicine_types/field
_ema_med_biosimilar/search_api_aggregation_ema_medicine_types/field_ema_m
ed_biosimilar [https://perma.cc/7YB3-TWM4] (noting two more applications were
refused and, of the 66 approved products, 9 were withdrawn).
Notably, the first biosimilar approved in by the EMA was also approved in
the United States that same year, albeit not as a biosimilar but rather as a drug. See
Jonathan Darrow, The Rise of Biosimilars: Success of the BPCIA? (Part II), BILL OF
HEALTH BLOG (Feb. 3, 2020), https://blog.petrieflom.law.harvard.edu/2020/02/03/
the-rise-of-biosimilars-success-of-the-bpcia-part-ii/ [https://perma.cc/5TFS-YGD4]
(discussing the approval of somatropin (Omnitrope) in both Europe and the United
States in 2006.
The comparison to Europe is only helpful with respect to the track record of
follow-on product approvals to show the FDA’s relative delay as compared with the
EMA. The comparison to Europe becomes less helpful, however, perhaps even
meaningless, when it comes to levels of competition in biologics markets and
resultant price drops. This is because of two main reasons. First, virtually all
European Union (EU) member states have implemented measures to control the
price of biologics and do not rely on competition as the sole means of increasing
access to biologics. Second, unlike the United States, Europe does not have a central
framework for approval of biologics as interchangeable with each other and the
substitution of original biologics with their follow-on versions is subject to specific
arrangements within each of the EU member states. See, e.g., David J. Gross et al.,
International Pharmaceutical Spending Controls: France, Germany, Sweden, and
the
United
Kingdom,
HEALTH
CARE
FIN.
REV.
(1994),
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4193451/ [https://perma.cc/DZN
9-8J2J]; Pugatch Consilium, Towards a Sustainable European Market for OffPatent Biologics, at 7, 19–21 (2019), https://www.efpia.eu/media/412909/towardsa-sustainable-european-market-for-off-patent-biologics-pugatch-consilium.pdf
[https://perma.cc/B8UD-KRYZ].
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applications for follow-on biologics and another three years to issue
the final guidance.45 By that point, in April 2015, Europe had already
been approving follow-on biologics for marketing for nine years and
had granted approval to 21 follow-on biologic applications (with one
more application refused).46 The FDA’s relative delay is even more
disappointing in light of the establishment in June 2011 of a
collaboration between the FDA and the European Medicines Agency
whose purpose has been “the alignment on scientific approaches to the
evaluation of biosimilar medicines in order to increase convergence,
so that data developed for one regulatory authority could be accepted
to another regulatory authority.”47
But the most crucial delay has been in the implementation of
BPCIA’s most important part: the creation of a pathway for approval
of interchangeable biosimilars.48 As the Hatch–Waxman experience
has shown, a critical component of increasing access to
pharmaceuticals is the automatic substitution of original products with
45. See, respectively, FDA, Guidance for Industry, Scientific Considerations in
Demonstrating Biosimilarity to a Reference Product (Feb. 2012),
file:///C:/Users/yaniv/AppData/Local/Temp/FDA-2011-D-0605-0002.pdf; FDA,
Scientific Considerations in Demonstrating Biosimilarity to a Reference Product,
Guidance
for
Industry
(Apr.
2015),
file:///C:/Users/yaniv/AppData/Local/Temp/Scientific_Considerations_in_Demons
trating_Biosimilarity_to_a_Reference_Product_Guidance_for_Industr.pdf.
46. See
Medicines,
EUROPEAN
MEDICINES
AGENCY,
https://www.ema.europa.eu/en/medicines/field_ema_web_categories%253Aname_
field/Human/ema_group_types/ema_medicine/field_ema_med_status/authorised36/ema_medicine_types/field_ema_med_biosimilar/search_api_aggregation_ema_
medicine_types/field_ema_med_biosimilar
[https://perma.cc/7YB3-TWM4]
(showing the relative tardiness of the United States compared to Europe). Europe,
however, is not a good basis for comparison of price competition in biologics
because virtually all European countries employ one form or another of government
control over the price of pharmaceuticals, including biologics.
47. See EMA and FDA to Collaborate on Biosimilars, GENERICS AND
BIOSIMILARS
INITIATIVE
(July
1,
2011),
http://www.gabionline.net/Biosimilars/News/EMA-and-FDA-to-collaborate-onbiosimilars [https://perma.cc/E66E-AXFD]; Cluster Activities, EUROPEAN
MEDICINES
AGENCY,
https://www.ema.europa.eu/en/partnersnetworks/international-activities/cluster-activities#biosimilars-section
[https://perma.cc/6FU2-VJRX] (last accessed July 1, 2020).
48. Considerations in Demonstrating Interchangeability with a Reference
Product Guidance for Industry, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN, 1 (May 2019),
https://www.fda.gov/media/124907/download
[https://perma.cc/VEB7-5SU4];
Once approved as interchangeable, a biosimilar product, by definition, “may be
substituted for the reference product without the intervention of the health care
provider who prescribed the reference product.” 42 U.S.C. §§ 262(i)(3), (k)(2)(B),
(k)(3)(A)(ii), and (k)(4).
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their cheaper follow-on versions.49 Indeed, entry of mere alternative
pharmaceutical products (which are not automatically substitutable,
a.k.a. “me-too” drugs50) typically leads only to modest price drops, if
any.51 Without automatic substitution, competition from noninterchangeable biosimilars has not and is unlikely to result in
significant price competition.52 Yet it took the FDA more than nine
years after the enactment of BPCIA to issue its guidance on how the
FDA intends to evaluate interchangeability of follow-on biologics.53
49. To be sure, automatic substitution is a necessary but not sufficient condition.
To achieve significant price drops of over 70%, it is necessary that there be more
than just 2–3 alternatives in any given product market. See New Evidence Linking
Greater Generic Competition and Lower Generic Drug Prices supra note 21.
50. U.S. CONG., OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, PHARMACEUTICAL R&D:
COSTS, RISKS AND REWARDS, OTA-H-522, at 46 (1993). (“[M]e-too drugs are
introduced after the pioneer and are similar but not identical to pioneer compounds
. . . Many me-too drugs are developed through deliberate imitation of the pioneer
compound and have a shorter and more certain discovery period. . .. The pursuit of
“me-too” drugs is an attempt by rival firms to shave off part of the monopoly profits
enjoyed by the maker of the pioneer drug in a therapeutic class”).
51. See Aidan Hollis, Me Too Drugs: Is There a Problem?, (2004),
https://www.who.int/intellectualproperty/topics/ip/Me-tooDrugs_Hollis1.pdf?ua=1
[https://perma.cc/ZY7M-4ASQ] (“Me-too drugs very frequently not only fail to
increase price competition but may even lead to price increases”).
52. While there are a few notable exceptions, experience in both Europe and the
United States thus far indicates that entry of non-interchangeable biosimilars only
leads to price drops of about 5%–35%. See infra Table III Emerging Health Care
Issues: Follow-On Biologic Drug Competition, FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION
(2009), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/emerging-healthcare-issues-follow-biologic-drug-competition-federal-trade-commissionreport/p083901biologicsreport.pdf
(last
visited
June
3,
2020)
[https://perma.cc/675V-V7KP]; Francis Megerlin, et al., Biosimilars and the
European Experience: Implications for the United States, 32 HEALTH AFFAIRS 1803,
1803 (2013). But see, e.g., Eric Sagonowsky, AbbVie offers up 80% Humira
Discount in EU Tender Market to Hold Off Biosimilars: Report, FIERCEPHARMA
(Oct. 31, 2018), https://www.fiercepharma.com/pharma/abbvie-offers-up-80humira-discount-eu-tender-market-to-hold-off-biosims-report [https://perma.cc/
8KFT-4E66]. However, without interchangeability such price drops are highly
unlikely in the United States, which—unlike European countries (and virtually all
other countries)—has no means for controlling the price of pharmaceuticals and
relies exclusively on competition to lower the cost of biologics in hopes that market
mechanisms would, eventually, result in increased access. Examples of significant
price drops in certain biologics market products in specific European countries are
therefore not instructive for the United States.
53. Considerations in Demonstrating Interchangeability with a Reference
Product Guidance for Industry, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., (May 2019),
https://www.fda.gov/media/124907/download [https://perma.cc/R2WG-HNUP].
To be fair, in coming up with its interchangeability guidance, since no other
country—including Europe—has created a way of establishing interchangeability,
the FDA had to create a completely new framework without being able to learn
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Notably, recognizing the glacial pace of entry of competition
into biologics markets, in July 2018, the FDA announced a Biosimilars
Action Plan, whose stated goal is to increase patient access to
biologics and which includes measures and initiatives to that effect.54
As mandated under BPCIA,55 the FDA has also taken steps to increase
competition in older biologics (e.g., insulin and human growth
hormone, which have been previously approved as drugs) by
“deeming” them subject to follow-on competition under BPCIA as of
March 2020.56 The effects of these measures on competition in
biologics markets are yet to be seen.57
A second likely reason for BPCIA’s poor track record is that,
to begin with, making follow-on versions of biologics is a much more
complex, expensive, and risky (but apparently not more
time-consuming58) business than making follow-on versions of small(much) from experience in other jurisdictions.
54. Biosimilars Action Plan: Balancing Innovation and Competition, U.S. FOOD
& DRUG ADMIN., (Jul. 2018), https://www.fda.gov/media/114574/download
[https://perma.cc/2JZH-9U3W].
55. Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act of 2009, 42 U.S.C. § 262
note (2006, Supp. IV 2010) (Conforming Amendments Under The Federal Food,
Drug, And Cosmetic Act) (“An approved application for a biological product under
section 505 of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act . . . shall be deemed to be
a license for the biological product under [BPCIA] on the date that is 10 years after
the date of enactment of this Act.”).
56. See “Deemed to be a License” Provision of the BPCI Act, U.S. FOOD &
DRUG
ADMIN.,
https://www.fda.gov/drugs/guidance-compliance-regulatoryinformation/deemed-be-license-provision-bpci-act (last accessed May 16, 2020)
[https://perma.cc/6GJZ-7LB4]; List of Approved NDAs for Biological Products that
were Deemed to be BLAs on March 23, 2020, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (2020),
https://www.fda.gov/media/119229/download [https://perma.cc/C8B2-3JK5].
57. Several commentators, including former FDA Commissioner, Scott Gottlieb,
and the undersigned, have expressed skepticism regarding the FDA’s ability to lower
biologics prices. See, e.g., Simone A. Rose and Tracea Rice, The Biosimilar Action
Plan: An Effective Mechanism for Balancing Biologic Innovation and Competition
in the United States?, MCGEORGE LAW REVIEW (forthcoming 2020) (expressing
skepticism about the FDA’s Biosimilar Action Plan ability to curb anticompetitive
behaviors that negatively impact access to biologics); Sue Sutter, Interchangeability
Won’t Solve US Biosimilar Market’s Woes, FDA’s Gottlieb Says, PINK SHEET, Jul.
18,
2018,
https://pink.pharmaintelligence.informa.com/PS123525/Interchangeability-WontSolve-US-Biosimilar-Markets-Woes-FDAs-Gottlieb-Says; Sue Sutter, Biosimilar
Switching Studies May Not Be Worth Effort For US Interchangeability, Sponsors
Say,
PINK
SHEET,
Nov.
7,
2019,
https://pink.pharmaintelligence.informa.com/PS141151/Biosimilar-SwitchingStudies-May-Not-Be-Worth-Effort-For-US-Interchangeability-Sponsors-Say.
58. See Reed F. Beall et al., Pre-Market Development Times for Biologic Versus
Small-Molecule Drugs, 37 NATURE BIOTECH 708, 709 (2019).
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molecule drugs.59 As a result of this reality, only a handful companies
have the technical capabilities and financial means necessary to
develop and commercialize follow-on biologics, leading to highly
concentrated (and cartel-prone) product markets.
Other reasons for BPCIA’s poor track record can be traced
back to the original biologics industry’s successful efforts to block,
delay, and undermine competition in biologics markets by any means
at their disposal. As described more fully elsewhere, these successes
include convincing the FDA and Congress to accept and uphold the
industry’s view that regulatory filings submitted to the FDA are
proprietary and confidential;60 enacting laws in virtually all states and
United States territories that make the substitution of original
biologics with follow-on versions onerous and cumbersome;61 filing
lawsuits—sometimes multiple—against virtually any attempt to
approve and launch follow-on biologics;62 and amassing vast patent
portfolios with the explicit goal of deterring potential competitors
from attempting to develop and launch follow-on versions of original
biologics.63
59. See, e.g., Jonathan Darrow, The Rise of Biosimilars: Success of the BPCIA?
(Part
I),
BILL
OF
HEALTH
BLOG
(Jan.
31,
2020),
https://blog.petrieflom.law.harvard.edu/2020/01/31/the-rise-of-biosimilars-successof-the-bpcia/ [https://perma.cc/E8RS-FR56] (citing also differences in patient
population sizes and drug manufacturing, storage, and transportation costs).
60. See Heled, supra note 5, at 119; Yaniv Heled, The Case for Disclosure of
Biologics Manufacturing Information, 47 J. L. MED. ETHICS 54, 56 (2019).
61. See Heled, supra note 5, at 125–128 (2018).
62. Id. at 128–133; see also Joshua Whitehill, BPCIA Litigations, BIG
MOLECULE
WATCH
BLOG
(last
visited
June
1,
2020),
https://www.bigmoleculewatch.com/bpcia-patent-litigations/
[https://perma.cc/HSW8-GVJP] (listing 28 different litigation cases.)
63. See, e.g., Stanton R. Mehr, Can the FTC Clear a Path to Biosimilar Access
Through the Patent Thicket?, BIOSIMILAR DEVELOPMENT (Jun. 4, 2019),
https://www.biosimilardevelopment.com/doc/can-the-ftc-clear-a-path-forbiosimilar-access-through-the-patent-thicket-0001
[https://perma.cc/E2M8XDZT]; Andrew Pollack, Makers of Humira and Enbrel Using New Drug Patents
to Delay Generic Versions, N.Y. TIMES (Jul. 15, 2016) (quoting an AbbVie
executive saying “[a]ny company seeking to market a biosimilar version of Humira
will have to contend with this extensive patent estate, which AbbVie intends to
enforce vigorously”); Cynthia Koons, This Shield of Patents Protects the World’s
Best-Selling Drug, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Sept. 7, 2017, 5:00 AM),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-09-07/this-shield-of-patentsprotects-the-world-s-best-selling-drug [https://perma.cc/3PJ9-QWSW]; Biosimilars
Council, FAILURE TO LAUNCH: BARRIERS TO BIOSIMILAR MARKET ADOPTION 1, 4
(2019),
https://www.biosimilarscouncil.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/AAMBiosimilars-Council-Failure-to-Launch-2-web.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2EWA-
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Another possible contributor to BPCIA’s failure to result in
significant price drops is the lack of adoption of biosimilars by
patients, prescribers, and payors,64 which may also be partially
attributable to original biologics developers’ efforts to undermine
competition in biologics markets.65 This lack of adoption, in and of
itself, might be a result of some of the underlying realities of biologics
markets (e.g., insufficient cost savings to encourage switching to the
biosimilar, regulatory hassle involved in switching, lack of clear
clinical finding(s) of substitutability, etc.), and such lack of adoption
is sure to make the development and marketing of follow-on biologics
an even less attractive prospect.
Last but not least, BPCIA’s failure to instill significant levels
of competition into biologics markets is due to the act itself. Although
BPCIA drafters and proponents have sought to portray it as a
compromise between the interests of original and follow-on biologics
developers, the reality is that BPCIA has always been highly favorable
to the original biologics developers who forcefully promoted it.66 Most
critically, unlike the Hatch–Waxman Act, BPCIA does not make the
development and approval of follow-on biologics sufficiently cheap
for follow-on product developers, making it difficult for biosimilar
KQ2U].
64. See, e.g., Richard G. Frank, Friction in the Path to Use of Biosimilar Drugs,
378 NEW ENG. J. MED. 791, 791 (2018); Ed Silverman, Biosimilars Got the Cold
Shoulder from Health Plans when it Came to Preferred Coverage, STAT+ (May 20,
2020),
https://www.statnews.com/pharmalot/2020/05/20/biosimilars-biologicshealth-coverage-drug-prices/ [https://perma.cc/M3R2-2XNB]; Biosimilars Council,
FAILURE TO LAUNCH: BARRIERS TO BIOSIMILAR MARKET ADOPTION 1, 4 (2019),
https://www.biosimilarscouncil.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/AAMBiosimilars-Council-Failure-to-Launch-2-web.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2EWAKQ2U].
65. See, e.g., Citizen Pet., PFIZER, INC. (Aug. 22, 2018),
https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=FDA-2018-P-3281-0001
[https://perma.cc/76RQ-ES4M] (decrying “certain patient-directed materials and
social media disseminated by reference product sponsors omit[ing] or misstat[ing]
key aspects of the definition of a biosimilar” and mischaracterizing the concepts of
interchangeability and switching, and more); see also Promotional Labeling and
Advertising Considerations for Prescription Biological Reference and Biosimilar
Products Questions and Answers, Draft Guidance for Industry, U.S. FOOD AND
DRUG
ADMIN.
(2020),
https://www.fda.gov/media/134862/download
[https://perma.cc/62RS-2X4E].
66. See Heled, supra note 5, at 115–19. One possible way of achieving this goal
would be to make original biologics manufacturing information available to followon product developers, which would save them the significant resources necessary
to recreate their own version of the original biologic such that it is sufficiently similar
to be deemed “biosimilar” and/or interchangeable. Id.
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developers to sell their products at significant discounts compared to
the original product.67
V. CONCLUSION
Ten years after the enactment of BPCIA, the picture of
competition in biologics entails a meager dozen actors wrestling over
market share with their 16 me-too versions of 7 original reference
products with little price competition and small to minimal savings for
payors and patient-consumers. Competition in biologics at this time
does not even begin to resemble the extent, savings, or kind of
competition seen in drug markets even before the enactment of the
Hatch–Waxman Act, let alone a decade after it was signed into law.
The big winners in the current situation are pharma
companies—both original and follow-on—that share in the bounty of
increasing market demand for biologics and persistently high prices
with minimal price erosion due to the launch of a few noninterchangeable biosimilars per original product. At the same time,
BPCIA has brought very little change to patient-consumers who
continue to have few prescribing options for which they pay nearly the
same price as they would for the original product. For payors, BPCIA
provides very little salve to an ever-growing expenditure on biologics.
For doctors and pharmacists, the lack of automatic substitution and
increased administrative burden of using biosimilars mostly embodies
a headache.
If lowering the price of biologics is the goal and competition
(rather than direct price regulation) is the means by which we seek to
achieve that goal, then we ought to surmise that our primary
instrument for lowering the price of biologics is deeply flawed and
needs to be fixed. Setting aside the FDA’s partial responsibility for the
delay in the implementation of BPCIA, there is very little that the FDA
could do within the confines of its current powers to improve access
to biologics. As I have argued elsewhere, it is highly doubtful that the
measures the FDA is taking would be enough to lead to significant
price competition in biologics markets.68 Remedying the current state
of competition in biologics markets would require changing the
paradigm of approval of follow-on biologics. This, however, can only
67. See Heled, supra note 60, at 56–58.
68. See Heled, supra note 60, at 55; see also Rose & Rice, supra note 57, at 1.
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be done in primary legislation, making significant changes to BPCIA
itself. But to do so, we must first recognize that BPCIA in its current
form is not and, in all likelihood, will not bring significant price
competition to United States biologics markets.
While some still argue that BPCIA has not yet reached its full
potential of increasing access to biologics,69 it is imperative that we
ask: if BPCIA’s current track record is (still) not enough to convince
us that it has failed to achieve its goal of significantly increasing access
to biologics in the United States, what more would it take to reach such
a conclusion, and how much longer should policymakers wait before
we can surmise that? In answering this question, we ought to
remember that the real goal behind the efforts to increase competition
in biologics markets has never been to merely instigate some
competition, mostly over market share, in a few highly lucrative
product markets. Rather, it is to bring significant price drops that
increase access to biologics and ultimately improve public health.

69. See Jonathan Darrow, The Rise of Biosimilars: Success of the BPCIA? (Part
III),
BILL
OF
HEALTH
BLOG
(Feb.
4,
2020),
https://blog.petrieflom.law.harvard.edu/2020/02/04/the-rise-of-biosimilars-successof-the-bpcia-part-iii/ [https://perma.cc/C4W4-LCJ5].

102

TEXAS A&M J. PROP. L.

[Vol. 7

APPENDIX A
TABLE I
Product
Name

Biosimilar
Manufacturer

Hyrimoz

Sandoz

Cyltezo

Boehringer
Ingelheim

Abrilada

Pfizer

Amjevita

Amgen

Hadlima

Samsung
Bioepis

Mvasi

Amgen

Zirabev

Pfizer

Retacrit

Hospira/Pfizer

Erelzi

Sandoz

Active
Ingredient
adalimumabadaz
adalimumabadbm
adalimumabafzb
adalimumabatto
adalimumabbwwd
bevacizumabawwb
bevacizumabbvzr
epoetin alfaepbx
etanerceptszzs
etanerceptykro
filgrastim-aafi
filgrastimsndz

Reference
product

Reference
Manufacturer

Date of
Approval

Available
as of
3/23/2020?

Humira

AbbVie

10/30/2018

No

Humira

AbbVie

8/25/2017

No

Humira

AbbVie

11/15/2019

No

Humira

AbbVie

9/23/2016

No

Humira

AbbVie

7/23/2019

No

Avastin

Genentech

9/14/2017

Yes

7/18/2019

Avastin

Genentech

6/27/2019

Yes

1/13/2020

Epogen/Procrit

Amgen

5/15/2018

Yes

11/12/2018

Enbrel

Amgen

8/30/2016

No

Enbrel

Amgen

4/25/2019

No

Neupogen

Amgen

7/20/2018

Yes

10/1/2018

Neupogen

Amgen

3/6/2015

Yes

9/3/2015

4/21/2017

Yes

7/24/2017

12/6/2019

No

Nivestym

Samsung
Bioepis
Hospira/Pfizer

Zarxio

Sandoz

Renflexis

Samsung
Bioepis

infliximababda

Remicade

Avsola

Amgen

infliximabaxxq

Remicade

Inflectra

Celltrion/Teva

infliximabdyyb

Remicade

Janssen
Biotech (J&J
subsidiary)

4/5/2016

Yes

Ixifi

Pfizer

infliximabqbtx

Remicade

Janssen
Biotech (J&J
subsidiary)

12/13/2017

No

Eticovo

70

Various sources on file with author.

Janssen
Biotech (J&J
subsidiary)
Janssen
Biotech (J&J
subsidiary)

Availability
on U.S.
Market70

11/28/2016
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Product
Name

Biosimilar
Manufacturer

Ziextenzo

Sandoz

Udenyca

Coherus
BioSciences

Fulphila

Mylan GmbH

Truxima

Celltrion/Teva

Ruxience

Pfizer

Kanjinti

Amgen

Ogivri

Mylan GmbH

Ontruzant

Samsung
Bioepis

Herzuma

Celltrion/Teva

Trazimera

Pfizer

71
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Active
Ingredient
pegfilgrastimbmez
pegfilgrastimcbqv
pegfilgrastimjmdb
rituximababbs
rituximabpvvr
trastuzumabanns
trastuzumabdkst
trastuzumabdttb
trastuzumabpkrb
trastuzumabqyyp
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Reference
product

Reference
Manufacturer

Date of
Approval

Available
as of
3/23/2020?

Availability
on U.S.
Market71

Neulasta

Amgen

11/4/2019

Yes

11/15/2019

Neulasta

Amgen

11/2/2018

Yes

1/3/2019

Neulasta

Amgen

6/4/2018

Yes

7/26/2018

Rituxan

Genentech

11/28/2018

Yes

11/7/2019

Rituxan

Genentech

7/23/2019

Yes

1/23/2020

Herceptin

Genentech

6/13/2019

Yes

7/18/2019

Herceptin

Genentech

12/1/2017

Yes

12/2/2019

Herceptin

Genentech

1/18/2019

No

4/15/2020

Herceptin

Genentech

12/14/2018

Yes

3/16/2020

Herceptin

Genentech

3/11/2019

Yes

2/19/2020

Various sources on file with author.
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TABLE II72

Product
Name

Average Price on
Drugs.com

Average Price
on
GoodRx.com

Hyrimoz
Cyltezo
Abrilada
Amjevita
Hadlima
Mvasi

$716.71 for a supply of 4
ml of intravenous solution
(awwb 25 mg/ml)

N/A

Zirabev

N/A

N/A

Retacrit

Retacrit injectable solution
(epbx 2000 units/ml
preservative-free) is around
$239.81 for a supply of 10
ml

$564.36 for 4
vials (1ml) of
Retacrit 10000
units/ml

Average Price of Reference
Product on Drugs.com
Humira subcutaneous kit (10
mg/0.1 ml) is around $5,810.97 for
a supply of 2
Humira subcutaneous kit (10
mg/0.1 ml) is around $5,810.97 for
a supply of 2
Humira subcutaneous kit (10
mg/0.1 ml) is around $5,810.97 for
a supply of 2
Humira subcutaneous kit (10
mg/0.1 ml) is around $5,810.97 for
a supply of 2
Humira subcutaneous kit (10
mg/0.1 ml) is around $5,810.97 for
a supply of 2
Avastin intravenous solution (25
mg/ml) is around $841.51 for a
supply of 4 ml
Avastin intravenous solution (25
mg/ml) is around $841.51 for a
supply of 4 ml
Epogen injectable solution (2000
units/ml preservative-free) is
around $355.69 for a supply of 10
ml

Erelzi

Enbrel subcutaneous kit 25 mg is
around $2,910.22 for a supply of 4
kits

Eticovo

Enbrel subcutaneous kit 25 mg is
around $2,910.22 for a supply of 4
kits

72

Data collected on May 7, 2020. All sources are on file with author.

Average Price of
Reference
Product on
GoodRx.com
$8,542 for 1 carton
(2 pens) of Humira
40mg/0.4ml
$8,542 for 1 carton
(2 pens) of Humira
40mg/0.4m
$8,542 for 1 carton
(2 pens) of Humira
40mg/0.4ml
$8,542 for 1 carton
(2 pens) of Humira
40mg/0.4ml
$8,542 for 1 carton
(2 pens) of Humira
40mg/0.4ml
N/A
N/A
$48.81 for 1 vial
(1ml) of Epogen
2000 units/ml
$8,389.15 for 1
carton (4 sure
clicks) of Enbrel
50mg
$8,389.15 for 1
carton (4 sure
clicks) of Enbrel
50mg

2021]

Product
Name

Nivestym

Zarxio

Renflexis

THE BIOLOGICS PRICE COMPETITION

Average Price on
GoodRX.com

Average Price of Reference
Product on Drugs.com

Average Price of
Reference
Product on
GoodRX.com

$2,254.90 for 5
syringes (0.8ml) of
Nivestym 480mcg

Neupogen injectable solution
(300 mcg/ml) is around
$3,296.36 for a supply of 10 ml
or $357.88 for 0.5 ml at
300mcg/0.5ml

$2,370.92 for 5
syringes (0.5ml)
of Neupogen
300mcg

Zarxio injectable solution
(sndz 300 mcg/0.5 ml) is
around $295.93 for a supply of
0.5 ml

$1,652.01 for 5
syringes (0.5ml) of
Zarxio 300mcg

Neupogen injectable solution
(300 mcg/ml) is around
$3,296.36 for a supply of 10 ml

$2,370.92 for 5
syringes (0.5ml)
of Neupogen
300mcg

Renflexis intravenous powder
for injection abda 100 mg is
around $796.04 for a supply of
1 powder for injection

$4,520.54 for 5
vials of Renflexis
100mg

Remicade intravenous powder
for injection 100 mg is around
$1,228.70 for a supply of 1
powder for injection

$5,736.81 for 4
vials of Remicade
100mg

Remicade intravenous powder
for injection 100 mg is around
$1,228.70 for a supply of 1
powder for injection

$5,736.81 for 4
vials of Remicade
100mg

Remicade intravenous powder
for injection 100 mg is around
$1,228.70 for a supply of 1
powder for injection

$5,736.81 for 4
vials of Remicade
100mg

Remicade intravenous powder
for injection 100 mg is around
$1,228.70 for a supply of 1
powder for injection

$5,736.81 for 4
vials of Remicade
100mg

Neulasta subcutaneous solution
(6 mg/0.6 ml) is around
$6,514.72 for a supply of 0.6 ml

$8,402.23 for 1
syringe of
Neulasta
(6mg/0.6ml)

Neulasta subcutaneous solution
(6 mg/0.6 ml) is around
$6,514.72 for a supply of 0.6 ml

$8,402.23 for 1
syringe of
Neulasta
(6mg/0.6ml)

Neulasta subcutaneous solution
(6 mg/0.6 ml) is around
$6,514.72 for a supply of 0.6 ml

$8,402.23 for 1
syringe of
Neulasta
(6mg/0.6ml)

Average Price on Drugs.com

Nivestym injectable solution
(aafi 300 mcg/0.5 ml) is
around $238.14 for a supply of
0.5 ml

Avsola

Inflectra
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Inflectra intravenous powder
for injection dyyb 100 mg is
around $997.42 for a supply of
1 powder for injection

$4,554.50 for 4
vials of Inflectra
100mg

Ixifi

Ziextenzo

Ziextenzo subcutaneous
solution (bmez 6 mg/0.6 ml) is
around $4,107.76 for a supply
of 0.6 ml

Udenyca

Udenyca subcutaneous
solution (cbqv 6 mg/0.6 ml) is
around $4,368.20 for a supply
of 0.6 ml

Fulphila

Fulphila subcutaneous
$5,532.26 for 1
solution (jmdb 6 mg/0.6 ml) is
syringe of Fulphilia
around $4,368.20 for a supply
(6mg/0.6ml)
of 0.6 ml

N/A

$5,462.74 for 1
syringe of Udenyca
(6mg/0.6ml)
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Product
Name

Average Price on
Drugs.com

Truxima

Truxima intravenous solution
(abbs 10 mg/ml) is around
$892.25 for a supply of 10
ml

Ruxience

Kanjinti

Ogivri

Ontruzant

Herzuma

Trazimera

N/A

Kanjinti intravenous powder
for injection anns 150 mg is
around $1,388.05 for a
supply of 1 powder for
injection
Ogivri intravenous powder
for injection dkst 150 mg is
around $1,392.44 for a
supply of 1 powder for
injection

N/A

N/A

N/A

[Vol. 7

Average
Price on
GoodRX.com

Average Price of
Reference Product on
Drugs.com

Average Price of
Reference
Product on
GoodRX.com

N/A

Rituxan intravenous
solution (10 mg/ml) is
around $990.36 for a
supply of 10 ml

N/A

N/A

Rituxan intravenous
solution (10 mg/ml) is
around $990.36 for a
supply of 10 ml

N/A

N/A

Herceptin intravenous
powder for injection 150
mg is around $1,636.49
for a supply of 1 powder
for injection

N/A

N/A

Herceptin intravenous
powder for injection 150
mg is around $1,636.49
for a supply of 1 powder
for injection

N/A

N/A

Herceptin intravenous
powder for injection 150
mg is around $1,636.49
for a supply of 1 powder
for injection

N/A

N/A

Herceptin intravenous
powder for injection 150
mg is around $1,636.49
for a supply of 1 powder
for injection

N/A

N/A

Herceptin intravenous
powder for injection 150
mg is around $1,636.49
for a supply of 1 powder
for injection

N/A

2021]
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TABLE III
% Lower
than
Reference
Product in
Early 2020
(Drugs.com
prices/other
sources)

% Lower
than
Reference
Product in
Early 2020
(Good Rx
prices)73

Reference
Date of
Approval

Reference
Years of
Exclusivity
Before
Biosimilar
Approval

Hyrimoz

12/31/2002

15.75

Cyltezo

12/31/2002

14.58

Abrilada

12/31/2002

16.83

Amjevita

12/31/2002

13.67

Hadlima

12/31/2002

16.50

2/26/2004

13.50

Product
Name

Mvasi

Price
Per
Month
(in $)73

10,161

14.83%

15%

Zirabev

9,201

N/A

23%

2/26/2004

15.33

Retacrit

992

32.58%

80%

6/1/1989

28.92

11/2/1998

17.75

Erelzi

Reference
Years of
Exclusivity
Before 1st
Biosimilar
Approval

Reference
Years of
Exclusivity
Before 1st
Biosimilar
Launch

11/2/1998

73

Launched
Biosimilars
per
Reference
Product

5

0

#NUM!

13.67

13.50

15.33

2

2

28.92

29.42

1

1

2

0

17.75
Eticovo

Approved
Biosimilars
per
Reference
Product

20.42

See Lauren Chase, A Guide to Biosimilar Prices: How Much They
Cost and How You Can Save, GOODRX BLOG (Apr. 14, 2020, 11:32
AM), https://www.goodrx.com/blog/biosimilars-prices-how-muchthey-cost-how-to-save/ [https://perma.cc/E5F8-3WAR].
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% Lower % Lower
Reference
than
than
Years of
Price
Reference Reference
Reference
Exclusivity
Per
Product in Product
Date of
Before
Month Early 2020 in Early
Approval
Biosimilar
(in $) (Drugs.com
2020
Approval
prices/other (Good Rx
sources)
prices)

[Vol. 7

Reference
Years of
Exclusivity
Before 1st
Biosimilar
Approval

Reference
Years of
Exclusivity
Before 1st
Biosimilar
Launch

16.50

17.00

Approved
Biosimilars
per
Reference
Product

Launched
Biosimilars
per
Reference
Product

Nivestym
438

33.46%

37%

2/20/1991

27.42

Zarxio

549

30.32%

18%

8/24/1998

16.50

Renflexis

3,014

35.21%

35%

8/24/1998

18.58

8/24/1998

21.25

Avsola
Inflectra

Ixifi

18.25
3,785

18.82%

19%

8/24/1998

17.58

8/24/1998

19.25

17.58

2

4

2

2
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Product
Name

Price
Per
Month
(in $)

% Lower
than
Reference
Product in
Early 2020
(Drugs.com
prices/other
sources)

% Lower
than
Reference
Product
in Early
2020
(Good Rx
prices)

Reference
Date of
Approval

Reference
Years of
Exclusivity
Before
Biosimilar
Approval

Ziextenzo

3,926

36.95%

37%

1/31/2002

17.75

Udenyca

4,175

32.95%

33%

1/31/2002

16.75

Fulphila

4,175

32.95%

33%

1/31/2002

16.33

Truxima

2,198

9.91%

9%

11/26/1997

21.00

Ruxience

1,863

N/A

24%

11/26/1997

21.58

Kanjinti

3,961

15.18%

15%

9/25/1998

20.67

Ogivri

3,974

14.91%

15%

9/25/1998

19.17

9/25/1998

20.25

Ontruzant
Herzuma

4,208

10%

10%

9/25/1998

20.17

Trazimera

3,391

22%

27%

9/25/1998

20.42
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Reference
Years of
Exclusivity
Before 1st
Biosimilar
Approval

Reference
Years of
Exclusivity
Before 1st
Biosimilar
Launch

Approved
Biosimilars
per
Reference
Product

Launched
Biosimilars
per
Reference
Product

16.33

16.42

3

3

21.00

21.92

2

2

19.17

20.75

5

4

